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News from the Front!

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IN THIS ISSUE!

Handing Bosnia a Permanent Demining Capability	Pg 1
Integration: The Key to Achieving the Army's Environmental Vision	Pg 7
Building a Field Newspaper: TTP from Operation PROVIDE HOPE	Pg 10
To Catch a War Criminal: The United Nations' Apprehension	Pg 12
Troop-Leading Procedure Checklist for the NG Firing Btry Cmdr	Pg 17
Writing a Meaningful Battalion Annual Command History	Pg 24
MILES and the Fluted Barrel	Pg 29
Headquarters and Supply Company - Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants	Pg 30
CALL Masthead and Web Site Information	Pg 31

HANDING BOSNIA A PERMANENT DEMINING CAPABILITY

by CPT R. Wendell Stevens, Military Analyst, CALL CAAT, Bosnia



Minefields in Bosnia psychologically and physically hindered freedom of movement, blocked economic activity, and prevented full implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP). An estimated 350,000 mines were laid in U.S. sector, or Multi-National Division (North) (MND(N))'s sector and over one million throughout Bosnia. Mines composed a great risk to both military and civilian personnel, injuring or killing 300 civilians since 1996. It has even been estimated that mine-clearing operations could continue in Bosnia for the next 200 years! Developing and implementing a sustainable demining capability within Bosnia is one of the five pillars of success in creating a secure and stable environment, the end goal of the United Nations (UN)'s intervention, as shown in Figure 1. The sooner this capability can be handed over, the sooner UN and U.S. forces can withdraw as well.





Figure 1. The U.S. and MND(N) Campaign Plan for Conclusion of Operations in Bosnia.

To facilitate the demining pillar, United States Army engineers in MND(N) developed a Countermine Campaign that addressed both the military and civilian components of demining operations in Bosnia, from the national level down to individual Entity Armed Forces (EAF) deminer. This article describes the multi-echelon approach of the Countermine Campaign to develop a permanent demining capability within the EAFs and dramatically reduce the mine threat in Bosnia. Point of contact for the campaign plan is the Assistant Division Engineer, 1st Armor Division (Forward), Bosnia.

At the National Level

☞ **Engineers facilitated the SFOR ordnance amnesty program called Operation HARVEST from March to April 1998.** During this time, Bosnians were encouraged to turn in and/or report weapons, mines, ordnance, and any unexploded ordnance (UXO). Unlike military-sponsored amnesty programs in past operations, such as Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti, this program did not offer rewards for turned-in items. There was concern that Bosnians, especially children, would take dangerous risks to collect mines and UXOs. Operation HARVEST was so successful (over 600,000 pieces of small arms, ammunition, mines, grenades, and UXOs were collected in MND(N)) that the engineers extended the program through mid-May 1998 and scheduled a second one in the fall.

☞ **U.S. Special Forces established three permanent demining academies (one per entity) so the Entity Armed Forces (EAF) could train their own soldiers.** These academies will support the United Nations' intent to increase the number of deminers in the field, hand over long-term capabilities to the entity armies, train all deminers to the Humanitarian Demining standard (certified 99.6-percent minefree), increase demining efficiency and reduce mine-related casualties. The instruction is based off training conducted by the United States Army Engineer Center and engineer units currently in Bosnia. The U.S. Department of State fully funded this program, and the three academies opened with 75 students in May 1998.

At the Multi-National Division (North) Level

☞ MND(N) engineers established a Mine Action Center (MAC) to monitor all demining activities in sector and coordinate efforts with the UN MAC. The MND(N) MAC maintained and updated records of all known minefields and demining efforts. It then forwarded this information to the Stabilization Force (SFOR) level on a weekly basis. The MND(N) was overseen by the Task Force engineer and run by an engineer first lieutenant (see **CALL Newsletter No. 98-6**, Mar 98, *Fighting the Mine War in Bosnia*, for further details).

☞ Military engineers monitored EAF mine-lifting operations for safety, effectiveness, and compliance with the GFAP. In MND(N), engineer platoons and squads daily monitored 20 different teams. To organize their efforts, engineers proactively coordinated with the EAFs on demining operations and developed a Mine-Lifting Monitor Checklist (Figure 2) to augment the TFE Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP).

Mine-Lifting Monitor Checklist

- Verify linkup time and site for coming week out and then day prior.
- Ensure Pre-Combat Inspections on all equipment are made the night prior to any mission.
- Additional Equipment Needed:
 - Four vehicles (wheels or tracks?), although two vehicles used when possible.
 - Precise Lightweight Global Positioning System Receiver (PLGR), with charged battery.
 - Crew-served weapons.
 - Minefield marking materials: pickets, wire, sledgehammer, measuring tape, and compass (mandatory per SFOR SOP 7200).
 - Cleared route-marking materials.
 - Megaphone and whistle.
- Force protection level checked daily prior to departure.
- Required Paperwork.
 - Current map with mine-cleared routes clearly shown.
 - Current printout of the minefield report and map, to include reports of all neighboring minefields. (The Digital Minefield Reporting System (DMRS) proved extremely useful to print out and update a daily minefield status).
 - Demining regulations and manuals (Chapter 8 to SFOR Instruction to the Parties; SFOR SOP 7200).
 - Copy of current Rules of Engagement (ROE).
 - UXO 9-line report and MEDEVAC Request.
- Radio communications. Conduct radio checks prior to departure. Maintain continuous radio contact with the tactical operations center (TOC), to include radio checks every 30 minutes and prior to any demolition.
- Battle drills, established and rehearsed, for contingencies.
 - Reaction to enemy fire.
 - Violation of Zone of Separation requirements by the monitored entity.
 - Entity's failure to participate.
 - Mine casualty on site.
 - Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) discovered on site.
- What route-clearance equipment is on-call (Panther, mini-flail).
- Maintain a ready reference for all mines and UXOs in the area (CD-ROM "Ordnance of Bosnia").
- Debrief all actions; update minefield reports and maps.
- Training materials and aids for U.S. soldiers not on guard or monitoring duties.

Figure 2. Mine-Lifting Monitor Checklist Created by U.S. Army Engineer Units in Bosnia.

☞ Task Force Eagle (TFE) engineers developed and conducted a four-week Train-the-Trainer demining course in January 1998 for the EAFs, followed by a Basic Demining Course taught by the new EAF trainers in February. The MND(N) MAC and select engineer platoons provided the instructors and materials. Engineer leaders saw a definite improvement in safety and operations by the EAF deminers after the courses.

☞ The MND(N) MAC and U.S. Army engineers promoted mine awareness in the communities by distributing mine awareness literature, school visits, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) assistance with unexploded ordnance (Figure 3).




Figure 3. U.S. Soldiers Visit Communities and Hand Out Mine Awareness “Superman” Comic Books.

☞ MND(N) MAC conducted monthly bilateral meetings with each EAF chief engineer, Joint Military Council meetings, MND(N) engineer conferences, and coordination sessions with UN and commercial demining organizations in sector. These meetings helped to reconcile differences and conflicts between the military and civilian (UN) demining operations in Bosnia. Figure 4 compares the two operations and their resulting effects.



	Military Mine-Lifting Operations	Humanitarian Demining Operations
Standard/Definition	All mines on minefield report removed.	The ground is 99.6-percent "mine free," and a certificate is given.
Deminers	Entity Army soldiers supervised by SFOR.	Local deminers; foreign contractors.
Training	Prior military; Humanitarian Demining Academy	Prior military or civilian; contractor employees
Pay	Regular military salary @ 300 DM/month	Contractor pays @ 1,250 DM per month
Insurance	None	Yes
Funding	Entity; UN; SFOR	UN via the World Bank; private funds
Equipment	SFOR donations; Contractor	UN; Contractor
Risk	Med-High; "clear areas of 95-percent mines"	Low-Med; "clear areas 95-percent free of mines"

Results:

1. Increased potential of military mine lifters going to HDO for the better pay and lower risk, which causes resentment and turnover in the military units.
2. Military Mine Lifting and HDO are not coordinated and conducted to the same standards.
3. Overall, both are making progress on demining Bosnia.

Figure 4. Table Comparing Military Demining to Humanitarian Demining Operations (HDOs).

At the EAF Engineer Unit and Soldier Level (See Figure 5)




Figure 5. Attacking the Mine Problem with a Combination of Manual and Mechanical Means (Clockwise from top left: Soldier Fitted with Personal Protective Equipment; Mine Rollers; Instruction; Mini-flail).

☞ U.S. Army and other international agencies provided protective personal clothing, mine detection equipment, mechanical demining equipment (mine rollers, Panther, Mini-flail, and Mine Breaker 2000).

☞ U.S. and other MND(N) armies coordinated and established habitual relationships with EAF engineer units for mine-lifting operations.

☞ U.S. Army distributed a digital minefield database, the Digital Minefield Reporting System (DMRS), to aid both the EAF engineers and MND(N) mine-lifting monitors in conducting safe operations and recording accurate results. DMRS replaced the Engineer Operations System (E-OPS) in country to both catalog and print out minefield reports. The engineer companies found DMRS especially useful for daily operations, where minefield reports and maps could be immediately produced for each day's mine-lifting mission.

☞ The monitoring teams provided valuable equipment to the EAF mine-lifting efforts, such as Precise Lightweight Global Positioning System Receivers (PLGRs), personal protective suits, and mine detection devices, that made lifting more accurate and safer.

Key Lessons:

● The Countermine Campaign was effective because it set clear objectives and measures of effectiveness that were both achievable and comprehensive of the many demining operations and issues in country.

● The U.S. Army engineer leader, from sergeant to colonel, may be put in the position of enforcing and managing international policy, such as the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) demining requirements on the Entity Armed Forces (EAF).

● That UN humanitarian operations and priorities will, at times, conflict with military operations and priorities. It will be up to the military's benefit to work out a solution to these conflicts.

● Where possible, utilize and establish permanent and self-sustaining "train-the-trainer" demining programs to empower the indigenous military to train itself and safely conduct mine-lifting operations to the right standard.

● The Digital Minefield Reporting System (DMRS) program proved very useful as a large-scale database for collecting old and new minefield information and printing off field products.

● Precise Location Global Positioning System Receivers (PLGRs) are critical equipment for mine-lifting operations. Ensure all unit members can operate them to standard.

CONCLUSION

All of the multi-echelon of efforts contributed to the endstate of developing a secure and stable environment and creating a permanent demining capability in Bosnia in the following ways:

1. The amnesty program, military mine-lifting operations, mine awareness campaign, and integrated EAF-civilian efforts all help reduce the mine threat to peacekeepers and civilians.
2. Programs, such as the Train-the-Trainer course and Demining Academies, aid the EAFs to train their own military and generate more demining teams.
3. Contributions of mechanical demining equipment will expedite the safe removal of mines.☺

Integration: The Key to Achieving the Army's Environmental Vision

by Steve Flier

The Army will integrate environmental values into its mission in order to sustain readiness, improve the soldier's quality of life, strengthen community relationships, and provide sound stewardship of resources.

--Army Environmental Vision

The Secretary of the Army signed *The U.S. Army Environmental Strategy into the 21st Century*, the Army's concept for environmental excellence, in November 1992. In this strategy, the Secretary stated the Army's vision and established environmental goals. Although environmental projects and activities now consume more than two percent of the Army budget, full environmental compliance and stewardship have been elusive.

The challenge for the Army is to find a way to accomplish its combat training mission while protecting its lands and installations. Operational deployments to Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia highlighted the need for Army units to understand and implement environmental considerations in operational planning. The Army must train soldiers and commanders in necessary environmental skills, and provide knowledge to instill an environmental ethic as an institutional value.

Integration of environmental protection considerations into Army doctrine and training is key to achieving the Army's environmental vision. Environmental integration efforts at the U.S. Army Engineer School (USAES), Environmental Division, lead the way.

USAES Integration Mission

The USAES Environmental Division is the executive agent for Headquarters, TRADOC, to integrate environmental protection

considerations into Army doctrine and training. A key part of this program is a comprehensive effort to achieve environmental integration into the everyday tasks of soldiers. Performance of these tasks will help to instill in soldiers the Army environmental ethic, as environmental duties are seamlessly integrated into the mission.

As executive agent, the Environmental Division coordinates the comprehensive review of doctrine with TRADOC service schools participating in the TRADOC environmental working group. Environmental considerations are thereby integrated into new and existing Army doctrinal materials, and Army training products may then be revised to include environmental procedures. The Environmental Division is responding to Army environmental training needs with the development of new training products incorporating the latest legal and policy requirements in the most efficient format, such as computer or web-based training.

The Environmental Division participates in the HQ TRADOC Environmental Integration Steering Committee and chairs its Working Group, consisting of training developers from participating Army service schools. These training developers are all active in the environmental integration effort and in coordinating the projected integration workload for their individual schools. These schools support one another to achieve full environmental integration through sharing

information and technical expertise. Such a comprehensive, coordinated effort for environmental integration into military duties is unique within the Department of Defense.

Doctrinal Integration

The Environmental Division has developed environmental protection doctrine, **FM 20-400, *Military Environmental Protection***, scheduled for release in second quarter 1999. This document establishes environmental protection as a component of military operations--in garrison, during deployment, and, when possible, while confronting a hostile force. It covers a range of considerations, from the fundamental understanding of environmental protection in a military context, to unit self-assessment of environmental compliance, to environmental-related risk management as an input to decisionmaking.

Existing doctrine has been integrated for environmental considerations, as well. Among doctrine integrated are **FM 100-5, *Operations***; **FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations***; **FM 101-5-1, *Operational Terms and Graphics***; and **FM 22-100, *Army Leadership***. The environmental working group has thus far integrated environmental considerations into more than 300 doctrinal publications and training products--the executive agent alone has integrated or provided technical support on more than 85 of these products.

Training Integration

New environmental training products are being developed to address job-oriented environmental procedures, largely replacing earlier courses that stressed environmental awareness. Among other new training products developed by the Environmental Division is the Unit Environmental Compliance Officer (UECO) course, which trains the UECO in general

environmental knowledge, as well as installation-specific information to enable critical input to the decisionmaking process for the unit commander.

USAES is coordinating the effort to develop computer-based instruction that allows individuals flexibility in completing required training. Recently developed is the Common Core Multimedia Training Support Package, "Comply with Host Nation, Federal, State, and Local Environmental Laws and Regulations," for use by the Primary Leader Development course; the Warrant Officer Candidate course; and the Officer's Pre-Commissioning Course. Future training development initiatives include the conversion to web-based training, which will be made available via the Internet. Web training products will have the benefit of being universally available and can be revised instantly. A prime candidate for conversion to web-based training is the UECO course.

Evaluating Integration Effectiveness

In 1996, USAES initiated a project to measure the impact that the environmental integration program has had on training at the unit leadership level. USAES developed an interview guide and an environmental training survey to accomplish this measurement process. In this effort, a total of more than 320 individuals--military and civilian ranks at all levels from shop personnel through senior management, including officers, senior NCOs, DA civilians, and local environmental protection specialists in CONUS-, USAREUR-, Korea-, and Hawaii-based units--were interviewed or surveyed regarding environmental concerns. These concerns covered topics including Unit Environmental Practices, Environmental Training Products, Unit Environmental Compliance Officer Requirements and Implementation, and General Environmental Knowledge.

In a separate effort, job-specific environmental integration opportunities were also identified--via comprehensive Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) task analyses--including a survey of more than 60 subject-matter experts from nine participating service schools.

The data collected from all these initiatives were analyzed for trends in environmental training and future training needs, with special attention given to the effectiveness of past HQ TRADOC-directed initiatives. Several interesting findings supported by the interview, analysis, and survey data follow:

★ Environmental awareness training products developed by the Environmental Division have been employed by the service schools to achieve, overall, an environmentally aware and committed force.

★ Although the objectives for environmental awareness appear to have been substantially met, task-oriented environmental training is sorely needed.

★ AR 200-1, January 1997, requires a trained Unit Environmental Compliance Officer to assist in environmental issues and train others in the unit; however, such training is scarce.

★ Leaders need to better integrate environmental requirements into planning operations and after-action reviews.

The Environmental Division anticipated that implementation of its awareness initiatives would positively affect the Army's environmental awareness level, and they have. But there is much work to do to complete the task of full environmental integration into Army doctrine and training.

Future Integration Initiatives

Due to the success of earlier awareness initiatives, a receptive audience has been cultivated for learning job-specific environmental skills and knowledge. Now is the time to capitalize on the increased environmental awareness that this HQ TRADOC initiative has been instrumental in bringing about; integration efforts to address job-specific environmental training need to be accelerated now.

Army Environmental Program awareness training will still be needed to satisfy an increased environmental ethos found in future Army leaders--a product of the American educational system's emphasis on environmental issues. Army leaders still require environmental awareness training to meet the professional, ethical expectations of those they will lead.

Meeting the Unit Environmental Compliance Officer training requirement of AR 200-1 would simultaneously address the identified need for

unit self-assessment and for installation-specific, job-oriented environmental training. The UECO course also addresses environmental risk assessments. Soldiers and leaders now rely on guidance from installation environmental cadre and range control to avoid having to perform these assessments. Neglect of their environmental training will become evident when troops deploy and local cadre are not available to guide them.

The UECO course should be taught either at the officer basic level, or as a distance learning or web-based course taken prior to the basic course. Through this mechanism, future leaders will be made aware of the skills and knowledge required, and the training support products available to them, through the environmental integration program.

Additional surveys and interviews need to be conducted, both as followup to questions raised in the present survey and to measure the effectiveness of MOS-specific training soon to go into effect as a result of the MOS analysis.

Summary

The Army is committed to supporting the environmental skills and knowledge soldiers need to perform their jobs in total compliance with local, state, federal, and host-nation requirements. USAES initiatives continue to focus on integration to achieve the most efficient mix of effective environmental protection and mission support.

For more information on USAES, Environmental Division initiatives, contact: fliers@wood.army.mil, 573-563-4122, or visit the USAES web site at www.wood.army.mil.★

Building a Field Newspaper:

TTP from Operation PROVIDE HOPE - Somalia

by Sergeant Major Karen Murdock, Editor-in-Chief, *NCO Journal*, Fort Bliss, TX

“A sense of community held together by clearly defined and precisely communicated goals and visions will produce extraordinary results....How we promote ourselves to each other speaks volumes as to who we are as an organization. Clearly, the better our people are informed, the better they will perform.”¹

--Brigadier General Ronald T. Sconyers, U.S. Air Force

Introduction

The Joint Information Bureau (JIB) for Operation PROVIDE HOPE was established as a part of a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), and deployed to Somalia in December 1992. When the JIB was fully formed at the remains of the American Embassy in Mogadishu, there were approximately 60 public affairs officers (PAOs), warrant officers and enlisted personnel. The lack of coordination prior to deployment complicated matters once we were in theater. Because of the *ad hoc* nature of the unit, the simple became difficult. Just attempting to maintain basic life support for the 60 personnel assigned to the JIB became a major endeavor and detracted from our ability to complete the mission.

For the first 10 days of Operation PROVIDE HOPE, civilian media interest was high, and the nightly JIB press briefings were packed. The military journalists assigned to the JIB acted mainly in support of the buildup. After the first week, we began to have some “permanent” life support facilities. We developed a method to ensure we had a regular supply of potable water, and we were able to procure a 110-volt AC generator from the Canadian forces in the area. Electricity and a steady supply of water allowed us to shift the focus of a significant part of our organizational energies from survival to mission accomplishment.

Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP)

➡ Organizing and Equipping the JIB Upon Deployment ➡

We organized the JIB and set up different sections: administration, media relations, and command information. We had plenty of military journalists, but no equipment. We had no darkrooms to develop film and no computers to write and file stories. One assigned journalist described it as the “Jetsons land in Bedrock.” An apt description.

The higher command ensured we had some of the equipment needed to perform our mission. We received an equipment package we referred to as a “JIB in a box.” The problem with this equipment package was all the computers, fax machines and other equipment in the package operated on 220-volt AC power. Unfortunately, the equipment package did not include any power generation equipment, and the generator we had been able to borrow only provided 110-volt AC power. We had expensive paperweights.

¹ Ronald T. Sconyers, Brigadier General, USAF, “Revolutionary Air Force Public Affairs, The Vision,” *Air Power Journal*, Fall 1995, pg. 5.



➡ Providing for Troop Unit Information Needs 📰

One big problem at the embassy was a total lack of information for the troops. Somalia was in a total state of anarchy. There were no television or radio stations. AFRTS had been returned to the United States. The belief was that U.S. forces were expected to be leaving soon. Thus, there was an attempt to paint the picture that there would be no “housekeeping” that would cause the troops to think we were staying forever. However, the troops were not getting any news. We would take magazines and newspapers off the planes as they came into the airport, but a few magazines were not going to solve the problem for approximately 3,000 people in camp. We decided to print a field newspaper.

We wanted to keep the troops informed. Operation PROVIDE HOPE had become “old” news; there were many other events occurring in the world at the same time. The new President (Bill Clinton) was being inaugurated, the World Trade Center had been blown up, the Waco standoff was in full swing, things were heating up in Southwest Asia again, and Camp Pendleton (the area where the majority of the troops were stationed) was experiencing torrential rains and flooding. The “news deprivation” was affecting morale.

Fortunately, within three weeks after deployment we had received equipment designed for operating on 110-volt AC power, and additionally managed to procure a few converters. We now had some computers to work with. We still had no darkroom, but we were sending the undeveloped rolls of film back with the troops who were departing for the United States.

An Army staff sergeant designed our publication, *The Somali Sun Times*. Our first edition was dated 15 January 1993. However, another problem arose – we had no printing capabilities. To solve this, we flew to Mombassa, Kenya, where the Air Force (which was already delivering the food supplies) was set up. We met an “importer/exporter” with whom we contracted to reproduce our four-page newspaper once per week.

The Somali Sun Times was an expensive venture. We paid \$600 for 1,000 copies per week. Unfortunately, we were unable to buy a copier for JIB use due to budgetary restriction. For the money we spent on “local” reproduction of the paper during its period of publication, we could have leased or purchased a copier outright; the copier could also have been used for JIB administrative support and for other mission requirements. Our printing arrangement also required us to make a weekly 500-mile journey to Mombassa. An unexpected benefit was provided for personnel. We were able to give our people a few days of being able to sleep in a “real” bed, get a shower, and relax on a rotating basis. It helped keep everyone sane.

The reaction to *The Somali Times* was unbelievable. We distributed the newspaper in the makeshift dining facility that had been constructed. During the first dinner shift, all 1,000 copies were put into circulation. In March, we also designed and published “News Flash.” This was a daily one- to three-page sheet of news we printed out on the laser printer. We only printed out enough to be posted at strategic points around camp: the door of the dining facility, the command group, the entrance to the embassy, etc. This publication was also well received. We got the news for publication in the “News Flash” from Associated Press (AP) wire copy received from the journalists still in Somalia. We usually traded meals, ready-to-eat (MRE) or computer paper for the copy. This may not be exactly a normal or approved way of conducting business, but in Somalia, we quickly learned nothing was “normal.” We were driven outside of “normal” operations to procure everything from basic life support needs to news.

Communications outside Somalia were another problem. We had a fax machine, but telephone service was not reliable. It was such a problem to receive faxes that we had a person who worked full time to get the *Early Bird* faxed in. On average, it took about seven hours to completely receive the *Early Bird*. We were able to connect occasionally with the precursor to *PA Link* (the Defense public affairs electronic bulletin board/news service), but the telephone line noise was so terrible, we rarely were able to download any news or conduct any e-mail business.

The best piece of advice for future deployments is to **expect the unexpected**. Each and every deployment is going to be different with its own set of problems and difficulties to overcome. There may be times you have to resort to unorthodox methods to get the mission accomplished. Hopefully, you will have the **people, equipment and resources** to do the job. And if you do not, you are still going to have to “make it happen.”

Conclusion

People need to stay informed – both about what is happening in their little corner of the world and what is happening to their families and loved ones “back in the world.” Normally, CNN, the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS), *Stars and Stripes*, the local newspaper, or a computer with internet access would satisfy this need for news. However, in a deployment situation, you never know what conditions you are going to encounter. But, it’s our job to make sure we keep the news flowing and the troops informed!📰

To Catch a War Criminal:

The United Nations Apprehension of an Indicted War Criminal

by CPT David S. Jones, USA, and Captain Paul J. McDowell, USAF

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United Nations, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, or the U.S. Government.

The White House

June 27, 1997

"I welcome the news that Slavko Dokmanovic, an indicted war criminal, has been apprehended by investigators for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), working with the UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES). I congratulate the ICTY and UNTAES on their successful apprehension. The United States continues to support fully the work of the Tribunal to bring indicted war criminals to justice."

Statement by President Bill Clinton

On 27 June 1997, UNTAES troops and members of ICTY apprehended Slavko Dokmanovic, a Croatian Serb and former mayor of Vukovar, Croatia, charged with war crimes in a sealed indictment. This would be the first such mission to use armed troops to apprehend an individual under indictment by the War Crimes Tribunal. As demonstrated 13 days later in

Prijedor, Bosnia-Herzegovina, when British Stabilization Force (SFOR) troops moved against local indicted war criminals, the United Nations and SFOR signaled a new determination to bring suspected war criminals to justice. After 18 months of inaction, the sudden change in course would have far-reaching and potentially hazardous

implications on UN and SFOR operations in the former Yugoslavia. This article provides **Tactics, Techniques and Procedures** and examines the background, planning and execution of the first successful arrest operation mounted in the former Yugoslavia: Operation LITTLE FLOWER.

Setting the Scene

The origins of Operation LITTLE FLOWER can be traced to the opening days of the conflict in the Fall of 1991. As Croatia slid into the abyss of civil war, Europe was faced with the inhumanities of mass murder, rape and wholesale destruction not seen since World War II. The outbreak of war was to be followed by years of failed attempts at bringing peace to the war-torn region. In the closing months of 1995, the United Nations, in conjunction with NATO, would take a more resolute stand in the pursuit of peace. The

first step was the signing of the Dayton Accords in Dayton, OH, leading to the December creation of the Implementation Force (IFOR). This was followed at Erdut, Croatia, with the signing of the Erdut agreement, which led to the creation of UNTAES. In January 1996, the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES) was established as a final act in the peaceful restoration of Croatian sovereignty over territory lost in the fall of 1991. Three years earlier the United Nations had established the

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) located in The Hague, Netherlands, in response to the horrific war crimes which were surfacing out of the bloodbath of the former Yugoslavia. UNTAES and ICTY would be brought together in the opening days of 1997 by a mass grave outside of Vukovar, Croatia. The grave contained the bodies of 200 murdered prisoners of war, and the organizations shared a common belief that such horrors should not go unpunished.

The Battle for Vukovar

The location where this event took place greatly belies its peaceful setting. A region of Croatia lying on the banks of the Danube (Dunav) River, that marks the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the Republic of Croatia, Eastern Slavonia is rich in both agriculture and oil. The region has a long history of mixed ethnic communities made up of Croats, Serbs, Hungarians and others. This area, historically known for its fertile farmlands, abundant wildlife and vineyards, became known for something far more sinister. It would soon become the focal point of some of the most brutal fighting in the breakup of Yugoslavia.

After conducting a referendum on 19 May 1991 regarding Croatia's future in the Yugoslav federation, the Republic of Croatia

declared its independence on 25 June 1991. Pressure from the European Community persuaded Croatia to delay the effective date of its independence until 8 October 1991.

Shortly after the June declaration of independence, Serbs living within the borders of Croatia intensified their armed insurrection against the Croatian government in an effort to carve out historically Serb regions. In the middle of this struggle stood the Yugoslav Peoples Army (JNA) led primarily by a Serbian-dominated officer corps. From the start of hostilities, the JNA would intervene in support of the Croatian Serb cause.

In what became an 86-day battle for Eastern Slavonia, by late August, the JNA and Serb Paramilitary forces over-ran much

of Eastern Slavonia where they occupied and laid waste to most non-Serb villages in the region. They then set about the task of laying siege to the city of Vukovar. Vukovar was one of the first of many cities in the Former Yugoslavia to suffer under a sustained artillery assault. The onslaught killed hundreds of civilians and soldiers and destroyed most of the city. From August until November, a Croatian garrison of never more than 2,500 National Guardsmen stood against a combined JNA and Serb paramilitary force of over 30,000 troops with tanks, artillery, and aircraft. Finally on 18 November 1991, the combined Serb forces over-ran the few remaining pockets of Croat defenders and occupied the remains of the city.

The Battle's Aftermath

The tragedy of Vukovar did not end with the fall of the city. During the last few days of the siege, several hundred people took refuge in the city hospital in Vukovar in the hope that it would be evacuated in the presence of international observers. An evacuation had been agreed upon in Zagreb in negotiations between the JNA and the Croatian government on 18 November 1991.

The day after the surrender, JNA troops took control of the Vukovar hospital along with the hundreds of sick and wounded civilians, soldiers, hospital staff and family members. Also counted among the numbers were Croatian soldiers seeking refuge among the wounded or acting as hospital staff.

During the course of the day, Serb paramilitary soldiers removed over 400 men from the hospital. Of these men, the JNA would load about 300 onto buses and trucks and move them to a federal Army barracks on the south side of the city.

During the short two hours that the buses were at the barracks, about 15 men were ordered released by JNA officers because they were hospital staff mistakenly picked up. The remaining men were then driven to Ovcara farm approximately four kilometers south of Vukovar. The beatings began from the moment that they stepped off the buses at Ovcara. The beatings continued for several hours resulting in the death of at least two

men. At one point, JNA troops intervened and secured the release of seven men who were taken back to Vukovar.

On the evening of 20 November 1991, the remaining men were removed from the building at Ovcara farm. According to ICTY documents, soldiers divided the men into groups of 10 to 20. In turn, each group was loaded into a truck, which then left the farm building only to return empty later in the evening. A short distance from the building, the trucks headed down a small dirt road between a cultivated field and a wooded area. When the trucks reached a prepared site, soldiers removed the prisoners, lined them up and shot them. After killing approximately 260 men in

the course of the evening, soldiers buried their victims with a bulldozer in a mass grave.

Of the 300 men removed from the Vukovar Hospital, 260 were to

remain missing. For their role in the fall of Vukovar and the massacre at Ovcaro farm, three JNA officers were to be indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for

the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). On 26 March 1996, for his role in the massacre, the Mayor of Vukovar, Slavko Dokmanovic, was to be added under sealed indictment.

UN Resolution 1037

15 January 1996

ARTICLE 21. Stresses that UNTAES shall cooperate with the International Tribunal in the performance of its mandate, including with regard to the protection of sites identified by the Prosecutor and persons conducting investigations for the International Tribunal.

Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (The First Attempt)

In early January of 1997, ICTY, Team 4 investigators traveled to UNTAES Headquarters in Vukovar to discuss the possibility of developing a plan for the arrest of Slavko Dokmanovic. The Transitional Administrator, Jacques Paul Klein, authorized the UNTAES staff to conduct planning with ICTY to enable the mission to respond to any future requests for assistance should an indicted war criminal be identified in the region.

As the end of January neared, ICTY identified an opportunity for an arrest to be made. Planning was still in its early stages at this point, and the Force Commander of UNTAES, Maj. Gen. Willy Hanset of Belgium, was far from comfortable with the serious lack of critical information about the suspect. A number of questions remained unanswered. Those involved in planning this operation had little knowledge of the individual's willingness or training to resist, what type of personal protection force he traveled with or even what type of support he still had inside the UNTAES region. But, there was a greater difficulty facing mission planners: the question was now one of how to

bring together a force made up of contingents from Belgium, Ukraine, Poland, Pakistan, Russia, as well as elements of the Transitional Police Force (TPF) and United Nations Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) and other UNTAES elements without compromising the mission. At the same time, UNTAES had to ensure that all participants, no matter how small their role, were aware of how the mission may impact their troops. As the planned date for the detention and arrest of the suspect neared, it became clear that the current force structure was too unwieldy to be effective and to maintain a necessary degree of operational security. Mission planners would need to pare down to a minimum the number of languages and organizations under UNTAES to maintain operational effectiveness and minimize chances of being compromised. On top of these problems, it was clear that the chance to conduct a rehearsal of the operation with all participating troops was not possible. If the mission proceeded, it would be "on the fly."

With some degree of relief, mission planners received word from ICTY investigators a mere 24

hours out from execution of the operation that the suspect was not going to show as planned and that the mission was canceled. With the pressure off and with many individuals believing that the suspect was aware that he was under indictment and wanted by the Hague, most of the UNTAES planners felt that such matters were best left to others outside of UNTAES. Believing the matter was over, those involved shelved the plan and hoped for another chance under better conditions.

Revised TTP (Build a Better Trap)

Having identified a number of serious flaws in the planning capabilities for an arrest mission, a small group of UNTAES planners were directed by the Transitional Administrator to prepare a force package from the available troops in the mission. In the future, the force package could be quickly prepared to execute the detention and arrest of war crime suspects. With clear guidance from the Transitional Administrator, serious planning commenced two months later, making use of only one contingent

from UNTAES. By May, the ICTY felt that another opportunity was nearing. Accordingly, an UNTAES representative was flown to The Hague, Netherlands, to lay out the parameters for any future arrest attempts to be conducted in the

UNTAES region. After a day of discussions on operational possibilities, the new planning group decided on a basic concept for the operation and set a target date. Within two weeks of the meeting in The Hague, the group

laid a base operation plan on the desk of the contingent commander whose troops would play the greatest role in the execution of the mission. The next four weeks gave the commander time to refine the plan and prepare his troops.

A New Window of Opportunity

As the target date approached, preparations intensified. The planners and forces involved felt that this time the mission was prepared and would be successful. At this point, all the planners and operators needed was for Dokmanovic to be as predictable as ICTY had claimed he would be. On 23 June 1997, the final rehearsals were conducted with all UNTAES and ICTY participants taking part. To the extent of being able to remain out of sight of the local populace, the rehearsals covered the actual area in which the operation would be executed. The plan received final approval from the Transitional Administrator who, at the time, was at UN Headquarters in New York where he had successfully cleared the mission with United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan and UN legal authorities. The planning group then made arrangements to transport the suspect from Croatia to The Hague. To accomplish this feat, the UNTAES Air Cell positioned a six-passenger executive class aircraft at Cepin Airfield just outside the UNTAES region. If all worked as planned, the aircraft would transport both the ICTY team and the suspect out of

the region within minutes of the takedown.

As often happens with the best-laid plans, the target did not cooperate. For three long days surveillance teams dug in at border crossings and the detention and arrest team waited anxiously for the suspect to enter the region. By 25 June it was clear that Dokmanovic would require an additional incentive to enter the UNTAES region.

Accordingly, late on 25 June, ICTY and UNTAES developed an alternate course of action which would ensure that Dokmanovic would feel comfortable crossing over from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) into the UNTAES-administered region of Croatia. Dokmanovic still owned a house in the region and the issue of compensation for the property greatly concerned him. Dokmanovic had also expressed a worry that Croatian authorities were eager to apprehend him. It became clear to the LITTLE FLOWER planning team that if Dokmanovic was going to travel in the UNTAES region and conduct any type of business, it must occur before 15 July when Croatian authorities

would begin reasserting authority over the region. Investigators from the ICTY had gained Dokmanovic's confidence by conducting interviews at his home in Sombor, FRY, over the previous days under the guise of investigating Croatian war crimes of which Dokmanovic had knowledge. The interviews served to build confidence between Dokmanovic and the agents and reinforce the idea that he was not wanted by the ICTY and that he had nothing to fear from ICTY or UNTAES.

Knowing that Dokmanovic was eager to make contact with UNTAES over property issues and having his full confidence that ICTY or UNTAES did not want him, ICTY investigators offered to arrange a meeting between Dokmanovic and UNTAES. The change in plan was quickly approved by UNTAES, and the groundwork was laid for Dokmanovic to enter the UNTAES region under the guise of meeting with UNTAES officials. The final act of gaining the full cooperation of Dokmanovic was providing a UN vehicle at the border to transport him to the meeting with UNTAES.

The Arrest

In preparation for Dokmanovic's arrest, the LITTLE FLOWER planners established a protocol to guarantee a smooth, speedy, and safe transfer of the suspect from UNTAES authorities to ICTY officers and then on to The Hague. ICTY would provide a voice recording of the reading of the suspect's rights and charges, and would maintain a recording capability until the suspect was handed over to Dutch authorities in The Hague. It was also important that video and still shots be made for documentation purposes; UNTAES would provide that capability. However, before the suspect would be able to leave the UNTAES AO and control, the planners agreed Dokmanovic should be given a medical examination. This would serve two purposes. First, it would ensure the suspect had not been harmed during the detention and arrest. More importantly, it would verify he was capable of making the trip to The Hague without having medical problems en route. The last

detail to be ironed out was that of coordinating press releases and other administrative matters between UNTAES and ICTY. These measures proved invaluable during the hectic hours following the arrest.

At 1455 on 27 June 1997, Slavko Dokmanovic and Milan Knezevic (a member of the local Serbian Executive Council), entered Eastern Slavonia in a UN vehicle driven by specially trained UNTAES troops. A short distance after crossing the Dunav River, as planned, the vehicle abruptly departed the road into a secured area and UNTAES troops seized Dokmanovic. The speed and violence of the maneuver prevented Dokmanovic from removing a loaded .357 Magnum pistol from his briefcase. UNTAES troops detained Dokmanovic as a wanted war criminal under indictment by the International War Crimes Tribunal. Within minutes of this detention, ICTY agents stepped from the shadows and placed Dokmanovic under arrest. Translators read him

both his rights and the charges against him. Within 20 minutes of his entry into the UNTAES AO, Dokmanovic was again moving, but this time under arrest and secured in a convoy of well-armed UN vehicles.

Upon his arrival at Cepin, UNTAES forces prepared Dokmanovic for the flight to the Netherlands. At this point, however, medical personnel identified that Dokmanovic's heart was exhibiting dangerous, irregular heartbeats. He was accordingly provided medication to help bring his heart rate under control. This discovery and the resulting medical attention cost 20 vital minutes at the airfield. It was a setback in time, but it ensured that a living, healthy suspect and not a stroke victim reached The Hague. Just over an hour and 10 minutes after entering Eastern Slavonia, Dokmanovic was "wheels up" en route to a Dutch military airbase in the Netherlands. The United Nations had crossed the war criminal's Rubicon.

Post Operations

With the departure of the aircraft bearing Dokmanovic from Cepin Airfield, a pre-arranged three-hour blackout on the arrest took effect. The intent of the blackout was to enable both UNTAES and ICTY to finalize press releases, upgrade security postures within the mission AO, and get the word out to other involved persons and missions. The Transitional Administrator, who had been airborne in an MI-8 helicopter over the vicinity of Cepin Airfield in the event serious problems developed and his intervention was necessary, returned to Vukovar HQ after Dokmanovic's

departure from Cepin. Upon his return to HQ, Mr. Klein initiated a prioritized list of phone numbers to start the notification process to senior United Nation and national government officials.

While Slavko Dokmanovic pondered his future in the Scheveningen Prison in The Hague, British troops of SFOR moved in to arrest two Bosnian Serb war crimes suspects under sealed indictment in Prijedor on 10 July 1997. Milan "Mico" Kovacevic was taken without incident. Simo Drijaca was killed in an exchange of gunfire that left one

British soldier wounded. Within days tensions escalated across Bosnia as suspected war criminals and supporters prepared for possible additional arrests. For months, the speculation of further apprehensions being planned circulated in the international media prompting SFOR-contributing nations to dispel these rumors. Hardly noticeable, however, back in Eastern Slavonia, a significant number of Serb hard-liners who feared their names might also be on sealed indictments, quietly left the region for Serbia and possibly beyond.

LESSONS

From a planning and operations perspective, many lessons can be learned from Operation LITTLE FLOWER. As stated, following the arrest, many other hard-liners with possible guilty consciences left the area. For purposes of peaceful integration of Eastern Slavonia, this was a positive side effect. In other operations of a similar nature where more than one suspect may be under surveillance, this is one result that should be reviewed for planning purposes. Other lessons

were equally important. These included the need for keeping the minimum number of people in the planning and execution phases of the operation; the need for a chance to rehearse the operation as much as environmental reality will allow; the need for clear command and control throughout the operation; the foresight to have qualified medical personnel on hand and the ability to provide rearguard security immediately after the operation and beyond to protect against possible retribution. But beyond serving as

a template for future operations to apprehend war criminals and serving notice to the guilty, LITTLE FLOWER did much more. Clearly, the presence of suspected war criminals living freely in the former Yugoslavia serves only to undermine the fragile peace that is currently in place. Operation LITTLE FLOWER demonstrated a dedicated willingness, despite the risks, to make an effort toward a lasting and just peace in the region. ☺

TROOP-LEADING PROCEDURE CHECKLIST FOR THE NATIONAL GUARD FIRING BATTERY COMMANDER

*by MAJ David G. Johnson and CPT Christopher J. Bonheim, Field Artillery Observer Controller/Trainers,
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THE ISSUE: Battery commanders and their subordinate leaders too often struggle with the concept of executing the *Eight Troop-Leading Procedures (TLPs)*. This trouble begins with the lack of user-friendly material that "shows" how to translate the battalion's field artillery support plan (FASP) into a workable plan for subordinate leaders to follow.

THE SOLUTION: Provide a doctrinally based, user-friendly checklist that prompts the battery commander, platoon leader, platoon sergeant, gunnery sergeant and section chiefs on what actions to take, questions to ask and tasks to prioritize and delegate.

1. RECEIVE THE MISSION.

☐ Questions to ask the Battalion S3 at FASP brief:

- ✓ What is the Commander's intent? (**TWO LEVELS UP**)
- ✓ **Mission and concept of the operation?**
- ✓ What is the **ENDSTATE**?
- ✓ What is the commander's acceptable risk?
- ✓ What battalion Essential Fire Support Tasks (EFSTs) and Essential Field Artillery Tasks (EFATs) are my responsibility (in priority)?
- ✓ **How much ammunition and of what type and lot do I need?**
- ✓ When and how will I get my ammunition?

- ✓ **Do I have any assigned special missions?** For example:
 - ✎ FASCAM?
 - ✎ Smoke?
 - ✎ Marking Round?
- ✓ What are my observer's call signs and frequencies and G/VLLD codes? For CPHD?
- ✓ Where are my observer locations and other information for special missions?
- ✓ Who are my backup observers?
- ✓ **When will the task be executed, and what is the trigger?**
- ✓ **Where are the Position Areas (PAs) I will fire from?** Are they secured? Have they been surveyed? **Do I have a center grid of the PA?**
- ✓ What units will be around me? What are their call signs, frequencies and missions?
- ✓ What is my movement priority? What is the route?
- ✓ What event triggers my movement?
- ✓ Do I have updated graphics, DST and execution/synchronization matrix?
- ✓ Do I have priority of survey? Do I have a conventional team available for Simultaneous Observation? Do I have any Survey Control Points (SCPs) in my area of operation (AO)?

□ **Questions to ask the Battalion S2 at FASP brief:**

- ✓ Weather and light data?
- ✓ What type of ground force? What is the enemy's organization?
- ✓ What are the number and type of enemy vehicles and type of weapons?
- ✓ What are the enemy's fire support capabilities?
- ✓ How will the enemy find me/what are his avenues of approach?
- ✓ **What is the enemy's mission/how will he react to me?**
- ✓ What is the enemy's most likely COA?
- ✓ What are the type, number and capabilities of the enemy's air assets?
- ✓ Where are the likely air routes?
- ✓ How will the enemy find the battery (i.e. direction finding, radar or observation capabilities)?
- ✓ **What are the phases of fire for this operation?**
- ✓ At what time in the battle will I be the enemy's priority target?
- ✓ When and where will the enemy use chemicals?
- ✓ What type of chemical weapons might the enemy use and with what effects?

□ **Begin your *MISSION ANALYSIS* after receipt of the FASP.**

- ✓ Use **METT-T** to begin your analysis.
 - ✎ What is the **MISSION**?
 - ✎ What is known about the **ENEMY**?
 - ✎ How will **TERRAIN** and weather affect the operation?
 - ✎ What **TROOPS** are available?
 - ✎ How much **TIME** is available?
- ✓ Stick to the **1/3 - 2/3 rule**.
 - ✎ **1/3** for you and **2/3** for subordinates to plan and prepare.
 - ✎ Plan for available daylight, travel time to and from FASP briefs, Rock Drills and rehearsals.
 - ✎ Don't forget the risk assessment.
- ✓ Identify the **Specified, Implied, Essential** tasks and **Limitations**.
 - ✎ **Specified tasks:** The tasks stated in the FASP.
 - ✎ **Implied tasks:** The tasks not stated in the FASP that must be accomplished to satisfy the overall mission or to satisfy any of the specified tasks.

☞ **Essential tasks:** The tasks from the list of specified and implied tasks that must be accomplished to complete the overall mission. **Essential Fire Support Tasks (EFSTs)** are "HOW" the maneuver commander wants fires used in achieving his objective. **Essential Field Artillery Tasks (EFATs)** are "HOW" the artillery will achieve its fire support mission or EFST.

☞ **Limitations:** The restrictions on the freedom of action of your battery/platoons. Restrictions prohibit the commander from doing something specific. Statements, such as "Be prepared to...." and "Not earlier than....," are limitations.

- ✓ Know the battalion commander's intent, including:
 - ☞ What is the purpose of the operation?
 - ☞ End state. How will the battlefield, in terms of the enemy and friendly forces, look after the operation is over?
 - ☞ Intent of the commanders two levels up (Battalion and Brigade).
 - ☞ What are the acceptable levels of risk? Safety or Operational?
- ✓ Identify the **EFSTs** and **EFATs**.
 - ☞ Brigade, battalion, and battery. If you are performing an R, a GSR, or a GS mission, you need to know the supported unit's EFSTs.
 - ☞ Know the task, purpose, method, and end state for each EFST and EFAT.
- ✓ **Plan** and **Prioritize** the **PCCs** and **PCIs** to be accomplished based on the **time, mission, and threat**.
- ✓ **Develop a tentative timeline.**
 - ☞ Use reverse planning to construct your timeline.
 - ☞ Events that take the longest must be set in motion first.
 - ☞ Time factors should be conservatively planned.
 - ☞ Plan for conducting the reconnaissance of position areas.
 - ☞ Plan for survey.
 - ☞ Factor in the time required to plan and issue the OPORD.
 - ☞ Plan for battery and platoon movements from TAA to position areas.
 - ☞ Plan for passage of lines and breaching.
 - ☞ Plan for a rock drill.
 - ☞ FA technical rehearsals.
 - ☞ Plan and Prioritize PCCs and PCIs.
 - ☞ Plan for ammunition resupply and vehicle refueling.
 - ☞ **AVOID WORKING IN THE DARK!!!!!!**
- ✓ Develop a Risk Assessment and Risk Management plan.
 - ☞ What are the **Hazards** associated with this mission?
 - ☞ What are the **Countermeasures** for the expected hazards?
 - ☞ What is the accepted level of risk associated with this mission?

2. ISSUE A WARNING ORDER (WARNORD). (Remember two things! First, information availability determines what is briefed in the WARNORD. Second, the more information disseminated during the WARNORD, the better prepared your soldiers will be.)

A. SITUATION

- ✓ Enemy Forces (Who is he? Where is he located? What is his strength? What is his most probable course of action?)
- ✓ Friendly Forces (What is BDE's mission and intent? What are the R, GSR, GS BNs EFSTs and EFATs, Who is on my left, right, front, rear? Who is in reserve?)
- ✓ Attachments and Detachments (Who is R, GSR, GS?)

B. BATTERY MISSION (Who, What, When, Where and Why)

C. EXECUTION

- ✓ What are the bde EFSTs?
- ✓ What are the bn EFATs?
- ✓ What are the battery/platoon EFATs?
- ✓ When is the OPORD brief? (time)
- ✓ What time is the rock drill?
- ✓ When is the FA technical rehearsal?
- ✓ The PCCs completed NLT.
- ✓ GSG reconnaissance of position areas completed NLT.
- ✓ PCIs completed NLT.
- ✓ When is the main body SP time?
- ✓ Rest and sleep plan for this mission.

D. SERVICE SUPPORT

- ✓ Classes of supply required?
- ✓ What type of ammunition is required (Type/Lot)?
- ✓ The R3P location and time?
- ✓ MET schedule/times.

E. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

- ✓ Battalion location (Combat and Field trains).
- ✓ When is the battalion rock drill?
- ✓ When is the battalion fire support rehearsal?
- ✓ When is the battalion FA technical rehearsal?
- ✓ What is the challenge and password?
- ✓ When is the frequency change over time?

3. MAKE A TENTATIVE PLAN.

A. Mission. Develop the battery mission. *Don't forget the commander's intent two levels up!* State the battery's EFATs that are required to accomplish the mission.

B. Enemy. Consider the type, size, organization, tactics, and equipment of the enemy. Identify their greatest threat and vulnerability.

C. Terrain. Analyze the effects of terrain and weather for both **friendly** and **enemy** forces. Use OACOK (see below).

✓ Observation and fields of fire.

- ☞ Does the battery/platoon's position facilitate continuous fire?
- ☞ Can the enemy enter my position without observation?
- ☞ Where can I best position my OP/LPs?
- ☞ Do my machine guns have grazing fire?
- ☞ Do my MK19s have good coverage of obstacles and dead space?
- ☞ Do the howitzers have direct fire observation?
- ☞ Are there sight-to-crest or intervening crest problems?
- ☞ How much dead space is to my front?
- ☞ Do obstacles in my position area offer an advantage to the enemy?

✓ Avenues of approach.

- ☞ Am I off high-speed enemy approaches?
- ☞ Do I have more than one entrance and exit route designated?
- ☞ Can the soil support my vehicles?

✓ Cover and concealment.

- ☞ Does the position offer defilade protection?
- ☞ Do I have protection from direct fires?
- ☞ Do I have protection from indirect fires?
- ☞ Do I have protection from aerial observation?

✓ **Obstacles.**

- ☞ Does the terrain restrict my ability to maneuver?
- ☞ Can I tie in my obstacle plan with the existing terrain?

✓ **Key terrain.**

- ☞ Does the position facilitate communications with assigned and monitored nets?
- ☞ Can I fight and survive in all three positions: **primary**, **alternate** and **supplementary**?

D. Troops available.

- ✓ What is the strength of my platoons/battery?
- ✓ What is the level of training of my platoons/battery?
- ✓ What is the condition of my soldiers (Rest/Sleep plan)?

E. Time available. Are there changes to the original time line briefed in the Warning Order?

F. Weather.

- ✓ What is the visibility (including fog) and light data?
- ✓ Will "Stand-To" be affected by the weather?
- ✓ What is the percent illumination and time of moon rise/set and the night-vision goggles (NVG) window?
- ✓ What is the precipitation, wind and temperature?
- ✓ How will the weather affect our operations, the enemy operations?

4. INITIATE MOVEMENT. This step can occur at any time. It is important that the battery has rehearsed SOPs, conducted its PCCs and PCIs, and rehearsed EFATs. The following are leader considerations.

- ✓ Is the initial time analysis correct?
- ✓ Are the assigned PCCs for this mission completed?
- ✓ Has the advance party (GSG) completed its RSOP? Is the next position area suitable for fighting?
- ✓ Are operational graphics updated?
- ✓ Has a survey been initiated and/or completed?
- ✓ Is the next position area secured?
- ✓ Coordination for passage of lines completed?

5. RECONNOITER.

- ✓ Has the map reconnaissance been completed before initiating RSOP?
- ✓ Have routes and potential position areas been identified on the map before departing?
- ✓ Is the position suitable for the platoon and/or battery elements?
- ✓ Are the alternate and supplementary positions selected?
- ✓ Is the "passage of lines" grid correct and identified?
- ✓ Is survey required? Has it been established?
- ✓ Is engineer support required?
- ✓ Is route security required?
- ✓ **(DEFENSE)** Is the position defensible against an enemy attack?
- ✓ **(DEFENSE)** Is the LP/OP positions selected?
- ✓ Did the GSG make a detailed sketch of the position area?
- ✓ Where are the release point(s)?
- ✓ Is there more than one avenue into and out of the position area?
- ✓ What changes to the original plan are needed?

6. COMPLETE THE PLAN. Use the 5-paragraph OPORD format. **REMEMBER - Time is your enemy. A 70-percent solution given on time is better than a 100-percent solution delivered too late.**

7. ISSUE THE COMPLETE ORDER.

- ✓ Has the OPORD brief been rehearsed?
- ✓ Do the section chiefs have updated graphics?
- ✓ Do I have a pointer (i.e., stick) to conduct my "Rock Drill?"
- ✓ Is my "Rock Drill" set up in an adequate location?
- ✓ Did I brief the **mission**, the **commander's intent**, **concept of the operation**, and assigned EFATs?
- ✓ Do I have "Brief-Back" questions to ask section chiefs and platoon leaders?

8. SUPERVISE.

A. Rehearsals. Conduct rehearsals on terrain that resembles the actual ground and, if possible, under similar light and weather conditions. Rehearsals should include all soldiers and leaders, but due to time constraints, you might only have the sections chiefs and above attend.

- ✓ Actions on the objective.
- ✓ React to indirect/direct fire.
- ✓ React to mounted and dismounted threat.
- ✓ Exercise Reaction Force.
- ✓ React to air attack.
- ✓ React to NBC attack.
- ✓ Mass CAL.
- ✓ POW procedures.
- ✓ Occupations.
- ✓ Hip Shoot (Emergency Fire Mission)
- ✓ Artillery raid (if it's your mission).
- ✓ Ambush (blocked, unblocked).
- ✓ Firing the priority target.
- ✓ CPHD mission.
- ✓ Passage of Lines.

B. Pre-Combat Inspections. A **final** PCI is conducted to reassure the unit's readiness. It consists of checking the PCCs stated in the BC's Warning Order and any additional PCCs added throughout the TLP process.

- ✓ Weapons and ammunition.
- ✓ Uniforms and equipment.
- ✓ Mission-essential equipment.
- ✓ Gun and FDC sections' understanding of the mission and their specific tasks.
- ✓ Communications equipment.
- ✓ Rations and water.
- ✓ Deficiencies noted during earlier inspections.
- ✓ Additional classes of supply.
- ✓ Aiming circle drills.
- ✓ Survey.

BATTERY OPORD (EXAMPLE)

I. SITUATION.

A. Enemy Forces

- (1) Key Terrain (What does it consist of? How will it affect **OUR** mission? How will it affect the **ENEMY'S** mission?).
- (2) Composition and Disposition (**Who** is the enemy?; **Where** is he located?).
- (3) Strength (**What** is the enemy's capabilities?).
- (4) Avenue of Approach (**Where** is going to come from? **What** is his most probable course of action?).
- (5) Phases of Fire.

B. Friendly Forces.

- (1) BDE mission/EFSTs.
- (2) BN mission/EFATs.

II. MISSION. (Who, What, When, Where, Why).

III. EXECUTION.

A. Concept of the Operation (This is the "HOW" of the mission; make sure your **intent is understood DOWN TO SECTION CHIEF LEVEL).**

B. Tasks to Platoon Leaders.

- (1) EFATs.
- (2) RTF (Ready to Fire).
- (3) Survey.
- (4) Immediate action status.

C. Coordinating Instructions (instructions that pertain to **two or **more** persons).**

- (1) Priorities of Work: PCC/Time
- (2) FS Rehearsal Time (Bn).
- (3) FA Rock Drill Time (Bn).
- (4) Btry/Plt Rock Drill.
- (5) Btry/Plt Movement Formation.
- (6) PCI Timeline.
- (7) Sleep/Rest Plan.
- (8) Risk Assessment.
- (9) Aiming Circle Priority.

IV. SERVICE SUPPORT.

A. Supply.

- (1) Class I (Food).
- (2) Class III (How much fuel is needed? Location of the FARP?).
- (3) Class V (What type of ammunition is needed, and how it will be broken down and distributed?).
- (4) Class VIII (What is the location of Ambulance Exchange Points?).

B. Maintenance.

- (1) Coordination for external support.
- (2) Vehicle recovery plan.

V. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

A. Command.

- (1) Location of battalion trains (Combat and Field).
- (2) Your location throughout the operation.

B. Signal.

- (1) Challenge and password.
- (2) Other signals. ☛



Writing a Meaningful Battalion Annual Command

H i s t o r y

by MAJ James E. Hutton, Military Analyst, Center for Army Lessons Learned

INTRODUCTION

Writing a comprehensive annual command history for a battalion is often relegated to an “if we can get to it” status. Battalions can painlessly assemble an annual command history using existing documents, such as training and actual operations orders (OPORDs), after-action reviews (AARs), commander’s guidance, etc., which have relevance to future unit commanders and members. By using a systematic approach to compile and prepare a focused and useful review, battalions will find that the process is not arduous.

This article provides a framework for the construction of a battalion’s annual review. Although **Army Regulation 870-5, Historical Activities, Military History: Responsibilities, Policies, and Procedures**, does not specifically require battalion history preparation (it is required at higher levels), the principal goal described in the regulation clearly states the importance of capturing unit histories:

“The Annual History is a written account of the operations and activities of an Army organization, installation, or school. It is an objective record of the preparing organization’s performance for the previous year and serves as its institutional memory and guide for future operations. The command uses the command’s Annual History to add historical perspective to the decisionmaking process. It is a primary source of background facts in support of the staff and is used to orient new commanders and personnel on the organization’s mission, recent activities, accomplishments, and issues.”¹

By using the simple paragraph structure described below a battalion can create a documentary history which provides command teams with information relevant to current and future operations and for use in developing training plans and building upon prior experience.

The body of the document is orderly and concise. It includes the following elements: *general context, foreword, command and staff, company-level histories, Battalion Structure, Training and Deployment Events, Unit Equipment, and Operations Orders and AARs*. It is accompanied by a *cover sheet, title page, and table of contents* (see **Appendix A** for complete sample outline). Company-level representatives can use the easy-to-follow outline to provide relevant data.

Battalions form the fighting nucleus of our great Army. Collecting and passing on insights through the use of a well thought-out annual command history can serve to better our combat capabilities. Capturing histories from the persons living them is essential to completing the record of our Army.

GENERAL CONTEXT

Readers must understand the overall setting in which a battalion history takes place. Useful entries in the battalion history include the following:

¹**Army Regulation 870-5, Historical Activities Military History: Responsibilities, Policies, and Procedures** (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1993), paragraph 4-6a.

The next two higher headquarters *mission statements*.
Area of responsibility (AOR) of the major command (MACOM).
A synopsis of *major* exercises, events, or contingency missions in which the next higher headquarters and sister battalions participated during the year.
An overview of *training guidance* from the next higher headquarters.
A general outline of events *scheduled for the next* training year.

By providing readers with a comprehensive overview of the battalion's situation, in full context, the company-level histories, battalion structure section, and the summary of training and deployment events will combine to complete the battalion history.

FOREWORD

Unlike the general context section, the battalion commander's foreword should contain a personal overview of the battalion's year. The commander's foreword can be one to two pages of text, but can easily extend to more pages if necessary. Elements of the foreword include the commander's assessment of the unit's overall status at the beginning of the year contrasted with the year-end status, events which impacted most on the battalion's fighting capability, major training insights, and advice for future commanders. It is important for the commander to provide information which has continuing relevance for commanders and staffs to follow.

COMMAND AND STAFF

List the commanders, staff officers and staff section non-commissioned officers in charge (NCOICs) by name as of the final day of the year. (**Note:** *Reviews are written in either calendar year or fiscal year (FY) format.*) This section provides a year-end snapshot. (Denote any changes in command during the year in the company-level history sections or the battalion structure section for changes in battalion command.) This section gives the reader potential name references for later study. It also gives incoming commanders and staff officers a convenient guide to the makeup of the battalion leadership.

COMPANY-LEVEL HISTORY SECTIONS

Company-level histories will make up the bulk of the historical review. In this section, the story of the battalion's year will most clearly emerge. Company-level commanders should make a personal effort to write this portion of the battalion review. While the effort may prove the most time consuming of the project, it is the company commander's best chance at fully documenting the operations of his unit and creating a document that is meaningful for future commanders and first sergeants.

Provide the company-level commanders wide latitude in developing the company histories. Allow the commanders to provide written material and downloadable graphics and photographs as part of the document. (**Note:** *Advise the commanders that copies of the history will be prepared in a popular word processing format (i.e., Microsoft Word, Word Perfect, Lotus or others) and ASCII. Graphic inclusions should merely supplement the text, not replace it.*)

As stated above, give commanders wide parameters for this section. The following suggestions may provide a structure that is useful to commanders in constructing their products:

Describe *training lessons* in detail.

Comment on all *major events*.

Discuss participation in *non-military events*, such as food drives, school adoption programs, unit functions, etc.

Changes in Procedures. Describe, for example, changes in a tactical operations center (TOC) layout or a decision to collocate elements which were split before. Explain the “why” behind the action.

Variation from Doctrine. If your unit conducted operations in a non-standard fashion, explain why and list the results.

Provide an account of any *changes of command*.

BATTALION STRUCTURE

This section focuses on the mission and key leaders of the battalion. In sections for the battalion headquarters and each of the company-level units, clearly list the units’ mission statements and mission-essential task list (METL). Write a short military biography of the battalion commander and the command sergeant major and the company-level commanders and first sergeants. In the biographies, include civilian and military education, a short summary of positions held previously (pay particular attention to combat action), and awards received. (The battalion executive officer and battalion S-3 can also be listed in this section if desired.) This information provides the reader/researcher with an accurate depiction of the relative experience level of the leadership of the battalion.

TRAINING AND DEPLOYMENT EVENTS

List beginning and ending dates of training events and deployments to actual operations. This entry provides a clear chronological recap of battalion events. Use the following example as a guide only:

Battalion Training and Deployment Events (During the Fiscal Year)

04-26 Oct 97	CMTC Rotation
02-17 Nov 97	Exercise STANDING WATCH
01-14 Dec 97	Exercise STRONG WALL
04-30 Jan 98	Grafenwoehr Rotation
14-28 Feb 98	A/B Command Post Exercise
14-27 Mar 98	HHC/C Command Post Exercise
01-30 May 98	Battalion Tri-National Command Post Exercise
06-19 Jul 98	World War II Commemoration Activities
07-12 Aug 98	Battalion Training Exercise
01-22 Sep 98	Grafenwoehr Rotation

There are many variations of this listing format. Company-level entries can easily be added to augment the battalion list. Synopses of the events may be added if a full description is not listed elsewhere in the document.

UNIT EQUIPMENT

List and describe major pieces of equipment. List the number of pieces of each major item (i.e., four M88A1 Tracked Recovery Vehicles). Include a section on equipment upgrades, revisions, and acquisitions. If possible, detail the battalion's major equipment maintenance history for the year. (Avoid references to equipment *readiness* if such inclusion would result in a classification of the review. Strive to complete a publication that is free of classified material.)

OPERATIONS ORDERS AND AFTER-ACTION REVIEWS

Attach OPORDs, with all fragmentary orders (FRAGOs), for training events and actual operations and subsequent AARs to the base document. Detailed OPORDs and AARs provide a reader with base-line information about important events. When read in conjunction with the additional contextual entries provided in the company/battery short histories and the battalion commander's foreword, follow-on commanders and researchers can gain a clear picture of operations.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONSIDERATIONS

Administrative considerations will focus on the "who and where" questions for the project. *Who should be the central coordinator?* In most battalions, the coordinator is likely to be the executive officer (XO). The XO can apply staff assets and provide the requisite supervision to ensure project completion. The XO should schedule quarterly in-progress reviews (IPRs) to ensure data is being collected as events occur. *Where should the completed document be sent and stored?* The completed document should be forwarded through the next higher headquarters to the major command (MACOM) historian. Again, while AR 870-5 does not specifically require this, good sense should dictate. Copies of the document should be maintained indefinitely in the battalion S-3 file. Further, the battalion commander and each company-level commander should maintain copies and ensure follow-on commanders are given read-ahead copies before assuming command.

CONCLUSION

Producing a battalion historical review provides a link between where we were, where we are, and where we are going. Personnel in units regularly rotate to new assignments or schools, or leave the Army. Capturing a comprehensive history must become a high priority for commanders as they seek to quickly assimilate in command and assist future commanders in doing the same. Such histories also provide a wealth of information to analysts, scholars, and doctrine writers. Rapid advances in technology and leadership systems require refined and useful information for good decisionmaking and for creating a vision for future planning.

Writers of battalion histories must provide readers with a clear, documented picture of what happened to the battalion during the year. By setting a general context and providing the insights of the battalion commander, the reader will understand what your battalion's purpose was within a wider framework. Providing lists of commanders' and staff members' names will also assist future commanders and researchers who may be able to contact past unit members for detailed histories. Company-level history sections, written with the company commanders' personal oversight, will contribute the largest amount of information to incoming command teams and will greatly assist in formulating training plans.

Entering a chronological recap of the year's events, combined with a full description of the battalion's major equipment inventory completes the snapshot in time of the battalion. Additional inclusion of attachments, particularly OPORDs and AARs will render great depth to the available documentation of the battalion's activities without unduly burdening staff officers.

We must tell the history of our great Army, not only for completion of the record or for sentimental value but primarily as a mechanism to improve our force. First, capturing and distributing a history will prove a valuable tool for incoming commanders and staff as they gain a full appreciation of the functions of their battalion. Second, by telling a contemporaneous history from the persons living it, the fog and filter of time will not impede our ability to understand in the finest detail the actual record. Tell the Army story and make it a routinely scheduled process each year to collect the relevant documents. Our future depends in large measure on our correct assessment of our past. ***Tell the story well!***

Appendix A Annual Command History Format Outline

COVER SHEET

TITLE PAGE

- a. The words “Annual Command History”
- b. Unit Name and Location
- c. Dates Covered and Date Prepared
- d. Author’s Name and Title
- e. Unit Mailing Address, Street Address, and E-mail Address

TABLE OF CONTENTS

GENERAL CONTEXT

FOREWORD

COMMAND AND STAFF

COMPANY-LEVEL HISTORIES

BATTALION STRUCTURE

TRAINING AND DEPLOYMENT EVENTS

UNIT EQUIPMENT

APPENDICES

- a. OPORDs and AARs
- b. Slide Presentations
- c. Photographs
- d. Newspaper Clippings
- e. Other documents as necessary🌀

Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) and the Fluted Barrel

by SSG Nicholas King, Operations NCO, CALL

In the summer of 1996, prior to an OPFOR mission they conducted against 1st Bn 22d Infantry's company team lanes, the 2d Bn 8th Infantry ran into a problem mounting their MILES main gun and coax machine gun transmitter on the newly installed fluted barrels for their Bradleys. The 1st Bn 22d Infantry was preparing for the AWE rotation at the National Training Center. In the process of conducting this mission, several pieces of equipment were damaged. The newly installed barrels did not allow the MILES to be properly placed on the 25-mm barrels of the Bradleys.

During one field problem, over six transmitters and several exhaust covers were damaged. The damage was caused by the inappropriate mounting of the transmitter. The new barrels require the transmitter to be mounted further down on the barrel since the diameter is larger than that of the old style barrels. The improper mounting caused the mounting bracket to strike the exhaust cover when the barrel was depressed to -10 mils while scanning over the right side of the vehicle.

The unit also experienced problems keeping a boresight with their transmitters. The transmitters would not hold tightly to the barrel because of the flutes. The unit discovered that with the flutes, the transmitter would shift during travel. The unit tried several fixes, including placing cardboard in the flutes and taping the lasers to the barrel. Unfortunately, these methods did not work.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES

The 2d Bnf 8th Infantry identified a fix to the problem. The unit removed the standard mounting bracket that comes on the transmitter and replaced it with large hose clamps, which form-fitted around the barrel. To apply this method, units need to remove the roll pins that hold the clamp to the transmitter base plate and insert the hose clamps through the plate, then attach it to the barrel. This action allows the lasers to be held much tighter than the original clamp. By applying this method, you will no longer have the problem of the mounting clamp hanging down to catch on the exhaust cover.☼ (See Figures 1 and 2.)




Figure 1. With Standard Clamp.




Figure 2. With Hose Clamp.



HEADQUARTERS AND SUPPLY COMPANY (HSC) PETROLEUM, OILS, AND LUBRICANTS (POL) by MAJ Patricia E. Reid, 127th Aviation Spt Btn, Support Operations Officer, 1st AD, Bosnia

POL Techniques and Procedures

NATO Adapters

Throughout the deployment of the 127th Aviation Support Battalion (ASB), the POL platoon was able to accept fuel for the host nation's trucks as a result of having on-hand NATO adapters. NATO adapters are routinely used at the unit's central region home for multi-national exercises and for use with German fuel contractors. Conversely, CONUS-based units which will deploy in support of Operation JOINT GUARD (OJG) will be required to requisition these items through their supply channels prior to deployment. These items are not required for most CONUS fuel operations.

Tank and Pump Unit (TPU) Adapters

The use of D1 adapters is another requirement for Class III operations. The adapters are required for use with TPUs. As a result of customer units not having these adapters on hand, the POL platoon is required to top-load the TPUs, which is not a recommended procedure for issuing fuel. Customer units should ensure that they fill all shortage annexes prior to deployment. Therefore, the supplying unit does not have to compromise safety to ensure mission accomplishment. It is imperative that the POL platoon knows exactly who its customers (and possible contractors) are and what type of equipment they will be operating during the deployment to mission accomplishment.

Metering

The POL platoon was able to maintain accountability of all fuel being issued and receipted as a result of an accurate metering device established at the Operations Base Fuel System Supply Point (FSSP). However, stick-gage measuring cannot be conducted on civilian-contracted trucks because they are not standardized similar to military trucks. Although the meter operated in liters instead of gallons, the conversion was easily made for all paperwork accountability. It is recommended that future units establish a contingency plan in the event that the FSSP main meter becomes inoperable. Additionally, it will become a requirement that this meter be calibrated yearly to ensure serviceability.

Scoop Loaders

Scoop loaders are authorized on HSC's MTOE. However, they are currently on the unit's critical shortage list. Because HSC did not have this equipment on hand during the renovation of the FSSP berms, it became a requirement to contract through civilian agencies. For HSC and replacement units to become self-sustaining, they will need these critical shortages filled. Having this equipment on hand will ultimately result in the saving of time and money.

Fuel Bags

HSC's Class III storage capacity for the FSSP is 140,000 gallons of fuel, with a minimum on-hand requirement of not less than 60,000. The FSSP consists of two 50K and two 20K fuel bags. Because the FSSP operation is the focal point of all the Class III operations on Tuzla Main and Base Operations, a contingency issue and reissue of 50K and 20K bags should be accessible within theater as installational property. These additional fuel bags should not affect the unit's MTOE; however, these items should be controlled on the installation property book.

Fuel Testing

HSC successfully managed the theater's fuel-testing operations for all multi-national forces in MND(N). Although there were only a handful of petroleum laboratory specialists (77L) organic to HSC, the unit was able to successfully process and complete more than 2,000 fuel samples collected throughout the SFOR theater. There were no significant obstacles faced by the HSC Air Mobile Fuel Laboratory during OJG. In garrison, 77Ls often found themselves conducting 77F operations and did not have the opportunity to conduct laboratory operations. Lab equipment is not organic to the unit's MTOE. A recommendation should be made to ensure 77Ls have sufficient overlap time between the current unit and the replacement unit when they arrive in theater.

Motor Gasoline (MOGAS)

Currently, there is very little MOGAS requirement on the Operations Base. HSC deployed with 2,475 gallons of MOGAS, and after eight months, still had 1,756 gallons of the original supply. This MOGAS HEMTT fueler can be a valuable asset for JP8 operations. If the requirement for MOGAS does not change for future units, it is recommended that MOGAS requirements come from a local contractor or that the MOGAS is stored in TPU or 500-gallon drums for issue.

Fuel Testers

The use of Aqua Glo Series III fuel testers is a requirement for aviation refueling operations. Not having these testers on hand and operational can result in a termination of operations. This would put mission accomplishment in jeopardy. A one-for-one exchange should be established in the theater for inoperational equipment such as the Aqua Glo, fuel bags and metering system. Establishing a one-for-one exchange as opposed to conducting a TI for turn-in would save the unit time during the time critical mission of OJG. The POL Platoon was able to have one repaired by the TMDE team. ☺